THE FUTURE OF THE EPISCOPAL AND PAPAL ROLES

A paper read at an IDOC colloquium in Rome, 13-14 October, 1969

By
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A Pastoral Research Centre Paper

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Amid the contestation within the Catholic Church since Vatican II, diverse currents of thought and action emphasizing theological, liturgical and pastoral orientations, have perhaps paid to little attention to the sociological patterns that are also at play. Modern sociology may be able to explain and help frame an answer or approach to problems that might seem remote from its sphere. In the following text, A.E.C.W.Spencer, director of the Pastoral Research Centre in London and past president of the International Conference on the Sociology of Religion, suggests how sociological insights can be put to the service of the church, specifically as regards the present confusion on the role of the papacy and the episcopacy. His study was first given as a conference during a colloquium organized by IDOC, Rome, October 13-14, 1969.

INTRODUCTION

The Catholic Church has changed profoundly in the decade that has passed since Pope John announced his intention to summon an ecumenical council. The caste-like stratification system is changing. The formal and informal organization of the church is changing. The mechanisms of social control are changing. The stance of the church towards change processes is itself changing. Conflict processes are now functioning quite differently from a decade ago. New types of leadership roles are emerging. The new ecclesiology of Vatican II is profoundly altering perceptions of the nature of the church.

Different rates of attitude change

These changes are affecting a religious community of 600-700 million very unequally: different groups are affected in different ways by different developments at different speeds at different times in different places. Some deeply regret Vatican II as an aberration from which the church must be rescued. Many embrace it and look to its early implementation. Many see it already as a milestone now past, and look to developments far more fundamental. But many more are simply bewildered by what is going on around them, looking to formal "leaders" who do not lead, and offended by the leadership that is offered by those who hold no title to lead.

Complexity of the present situation

There are so many variables, which before 1959 were constants, that a truly satisfactory analysis of the situation as seen by a sociologist has inevitably to be extremely complex and lengthy – so complex that the thread of the argument is easily lost. If instead the analysis is deliberately confined to a narrow theme, it is equally inevitable that topics of great relevance cannot be explored, assumptions cannot be established and many attempts at explanation seem unconvincing. It is, however, this latter method that I now propose to adopt.

Purpose of the paper

What I want to attempt is an examination of the role strains that have been manifested since 1959 in the Episcopal and papal roles, and to suggest ways in which these role strains may be eased. There are two reasons for this concentration of attention on the episcopal and papal roles at the present time. The first is that these two roles are extremely important within the church. They are important theologically because of the content of the church's doctrine, and they are important sociologically because of the key nature of these roles in the social structure of the church. The second reason is that there is abundant evidence that those affected by this role strain – the pope and the bishops themselves and their role set, those who have social interaction with them – are generally unaware of the nature and causes of these role strains. That they are aware of the strains is quite evident. Almost any Wednesday discourse provides evidence that the Holy Father is aware of these strains, and desperately worried by his own interpretation of their causes. There is also massive documentary and other evidence that diocesan bishops are aware of the strains they encounter in the performance of their roles. The mass media also show that many priests and laymen are aware of

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them too. There is no lack of analysis, or of advice about how to seek a remedy. Pope and bishops have never before been given so much advice on how to mend their ways and have seldom had so much advice of their own to give to those whose conduct, or misconduct, they see as lying at the root of their difficulties.

Unfortunately, this two-way flow of reasoning and advice does no more than exacerbate the role strains of pope and bishop. A great deal of it reflects the assumption that the difficulties are caused by moral defects in the other party – bishops or their critics, as the case may be. I do not wish to suggest that the world is without sin, but to attribute the current crises in the episcopal and papal roles to sin is simply to sterilize the normal social processes for resolving such crises. A great deal of the reasoning and advice supposes that the problems are basically due to defective personality formation: "they" are authoritarian, insensitive, domineering, etc. Or "they" are arrogant and lack a proper submissiveness and respect for authority. I do not want to suggest that personality factors are not relevant, but I consider that they can only account in part for these strains. Above all, they do not explain how it is that these strains have suddenly emerged in the last decade and in particular since the end of the council.

In my view the basic causes of the current crisis are neither moral nor psychological, but sociological. If I am right, and if those involved in the role conflict that surrounds the pope and the bishops can recognize that the causes *are* sociological, a great deal of useless heat will be taken out of the conflict and the search for viable solutions greatly facilitated.

BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM

Five centuries of cultural lag

There is wide agreement today that the Council of Trent was at least a century too late. The Renaissance had profound effects on European culture and society. It represented a quickening of the pace of change and the church as an institution was slow to adapt itself to these changes. The leadership did not interpret these changes to Christendom, did not redefine the goals of the church, did not restate the basic values of Christianity to restore meaning to them, and did not suggest new norms for preserving them adequately. There followed four centuries of ever quicker social change: the rise of merchant, industrial and finance capitalism, the industrial revolution, the Enlightenment, the rise of natural sciences and then social science, the rise of liberalism, socialism, communism, nationalism, imperialism, supranationalism and de-colonization. The church was already in a cultural lag in the sixteenth century; the lag increased with each succeeding century. Some adaptation to change there certainly was, such as the rise of new religious orders and the nineteenth century missionary movement. But these adaptations were slow and incomplete, so that by the mid-twentieth century a huge backlog of non-adaptation had built up, producing a diffuse, latent, unperceived, but fundamental crisis in the church.

Absence of problem awareness in the formal structures

It would be truer to say that the crisis was not perceived by the formal leadership of the church (1). The definition of papal infallibility in 1870 had lulled the church into a false sense of security, a feeling that whatever problems arose could be resolved by a *motu proprio* from the center, an encyclical, or a discourse to some international organization holding a conference in Rome. Given the bureaucratic structure of the higher echelons of the church, it was inevitable that information from the periphery would be filtered by the processes that are well-known to students of bureaucracy (2). Given the low scientific, professional and technical competence of the church's information system (3) it was equally inevitable that – filtered or not – the information collected by the center should be largely irrelevant, out-of-date and inaccurate. It was generally buried in the archives without any serious analysis or evaluation, used only as the basis for the "grilling" of bishops on the occasion of their *ad limina* visits to Rome.

Given the systematic discouragement of lateral communication normally encountered in bureaucratic institutions, the problem awareness of individual perceptive bishops was highly localized, so that few had any general view of the problems facing the church. Given the extreme secrecy fostered by the ecclesiastical bureaucracy, the overwhelming majority of the people of God were almost entirely ignorant of the church's basic problems.

Problem awareness in the "parallel movements"

This general lack of problem awareness was not, however, universal. Between the Modernist movement and 1959 there came into existence a series of parallel movements concerned with the fostering of values which the institutional church neglected: the biblical movement, the liturgical and vernacular movements, the catechetical movement, the Catholic branch of the ecumenical movement, the religious sociology movement and others. The concern of each for the promotion of its specific values reflected a measure of awareness of problems of adaptation created by social change. At one extreme, this awareness in the biblical movement was on a narrow front, but of immense theological significance. At the other extreme, in the religious sociology movement this awareness was on an extremely broad front. These parallel movements existed and worked in the narrow twilight area, on the margins of the institutional church, between values officially endorsed and values officially proscribed. They worked in isolation from each other and in no sense constituted a broad movement for renewal.

The preparatory period, 1959-1962, saw a steep rise in the level of activity of these movements. During Vatican II itself it soon became clear that prophets among the council fathers were asking the church to canonize the basic values of these movements, and largely succeeded in doing so. In the post-conciliar period, dominated so far by the struggle over the implementation of the critical decisions of the council, these movements have gradually coalesced into a broad renewal movement in the church, vastly strengthened by the council's endorsement of their basic tenets. There has thus recently emerged a social force in favor of renewal, varying greatly in strength from country to country.

Discovery of the functions of conflict

The next point to be made is the re-discovery of controlled conflict as a normal means of effecting internal change and adaptation to external change. The preparatory period witnessed an informal relaxation of the institutional controls over formal communications. This was extended during the council. Since 1965 the remaining formal controls have increasingly come to be seen as morally questionable and their effectiveness has continued to decline. They still remain strong enough, however, to place considerable restraint upon the public communications of bishops and clergy.

The group dynamic processes of the council

Caporale has demonstrated the extraordinary effects of group dynamic processes on the council fathers (4). Suddenly in October, 1962, all the institutional insulation that had for a century inhibited lateral communication between bishops was rendered ineffective. They were subjected to intense face-to-face interaction with each other in the novel role of council father. Their information and awareness of problems improved dramatically. A series of interest groups and pressure groups rapidly emerged. Most of them coalesced into a loose party for renewal. A minority, based on the curial cardinals and bishops, coalesced into a party defending the status quo. During the four sessions of the council, controlled conflict between these two parties was re-established as a means of problem-solving and decision-making.

The postconciliar backlash

The postconciliar period has seen several important developments. There has been a strong postconciliar backlash, as the conservative party attempted to restore its control on developments in the church. this has accelerated the development of a broadly based movement for renewal throughout the whole church, and has led to an increasing polarization of opinion as those previously uncommitted to either party have given their support to one or the other. This has been accompanied by a deepening and widening of the conflict, as evidenced by the extraordinary row over *Humanae vitae.* Internal conflict is now a major factor in the life of the church, but little has been done to control it by developing and institutionalizing norms that will confine it within reasonable limits, instead of suppressing it as before 1962.

Emergence of the pope as a party leader

Another major development since 1965 has been the emergence of the Holy Father as a party leader in the church, throwing the prestige of his high office behind those who seek to preserve the *status quo ante.* This has created major role dilemmas, and is the central theme of this paper. The pope has been attempting to combine within one office what have effectively become two roles prescribing different, mutually conflicting behaviors.

Difficulties faced by diocesan bishops since the council

This problem is seen most clearly in the papal role but it emerged earlier in the ordinary role of the diocesan bishop (5). The bishops before the council were preoccupied with a multitude of routine decisions. Most of them *made* and *took* these decisions themselves in an authoritarian fashion as either traditional or bureaucratic leaders. Most of them had little or no experience of critical decision-making before the council. They then spent several years *making critical decisions*, two of which are of outstanding importance: the doctrine of the people of God, which is increasingly perceived as a rejection of the old ecclesiology, and the doctrine of collegiality.

The difficulty has been the experience of *critical decision-making* in a collegial body during the council was so novel, and so unrelated to the traditional or bureaucratic processes customary at home, that most bishops have found it extremely difficult to translate the experience. Even during the council itself, it was often remarked how different from their behavior in Rome was the bishops' behavior between sessions back in their own dioceses. Too little attention has been paid to the analysis of this contrast, which has continued since the council ended. Too often it has been attributed to insincerity on the part of the bishops. I suggest that the explanation is psycho-sociological and not moral.

There seem to be two main reasons. First, a completely novel role which as to be played by some three thousand people at the same time, all equally inexperienced, facilitates a break with previous roles. The individual does not have to conform to the fixed expectations of his role set. The other members of the role set have no fixed expectations; all role expectations are highly tentative and continuously subject to modification. This facilitated a very free response to the situation. Second, the group dynamics of the council reflected an emotionally charged situation. The fathers knew – however dull the morning's speeches in the *aula* might have been – that the decisions they were making were quite critical for the church. This evoked as concentration of attention which was not merely emotionally and physically exhausting, but also insulated them during the sessions of the council from their other roles as diocesan bishops and auxiliaries. This too was liberating in its effect on their role performance. It was not difficult to get down to fundamentals and to develop radical solutions.

However, once back in their dioceses the psycho-sociological factors that had liberated the bishops during the four sessions of the council were entirely absent. For most of them the role of diocesan bishop or auxiliary was not novel. Instead of having to play it cloistered in some seclusion with three thousand other novices, they had to play it in the semi-public eye, and quite alone. Instead of their role set having no fixed expectations, most of their role set had fixed expectations that were little different from before the council. The role set of a diocesan bishop consists largely of senior clergy fairly advanced in years, most of them members of the diocesan curia. It is not a question of the bishop's role set deliberately plotting to undo what he and his fellows had done in Rome, but rather a predictable consequence of the daily pressures of working with men who expect and want him to behave as he did before the council. This consequence of daily interaction with the bishop's role set has been reinforced by regular interaction with a mass membership not greatly touched by Vatican II; at confirmations, visitations, pilgrimages, and other mass events the bishop has continued to meet many – though not be any means exclusively – who expect him to exercise his role as before.

Many bishops have tried conscientiously to re-shape their roles and in particular to be less autocratic. They have then encountered among the liberals a great deal of hostility. Not being familiar with the findings of the social psychologists, they have often reacted in alarm instead of persevering.

In few dioceses had there emerged – before *Humanae vitae* - any strong social force to support the bishop in his desire to reshape his role in the spirit of Vatican II. If he happened to be a man with a very strong personality, with a great deal of personal charism, or new to the role so that he was not burdened with familiarity with the old ways, or

surrounded by a role set that embraced Vatican II, then he sometimes managed to define a new episcopal role. But on the whole the Episcopal role has not greatly changed; the bishop continues to reserve to himself a multitude of routine decisions, and he continues to *make* as well as *take* these decisions himself. What is new is the increasing strain, felt by the bishop and observed by others, arising out of this role.

CAUSES OF THE ROLE STRAIN

Parsons' pattern variables

For the analysis of this new problem of episcopal role strain, I propose to use, in the main, Parsons' theory of the pattern variables of value orientations, and Rudge's typology of organization. Parsons suggested five ways of describing the behavioral alternatives that the incumbent of a role has to choose between (6). The first alternative is that between affectivity and instrumentality, between the enjoyment of *an end itself,* on the one hand ,and action that represents a means to an end that is fairly remote. The second alternative is that between the self and the collectivity orientation. The third is between universalism and particularism, and the fifth between diffuseness and specificity. Although the fourth and the fifth pattern variables have considerable relevance for the problem of the contemporary episcopal and papal roles, I want to concentrate attention on the first pattern variable, affectivity vs instrumentality.

Rudge's typology of organization

Recent work in the sociology of organization has yielded a typology of five ideal types: traditional, charismatic, bureaucratic, democratic and systemic (7). Let me briefly describe these.

Traditional. This is focused on maintaining a tradition. It is designed to maintain the status quo, and is controlled through the strength of tradition and the ignorance of alternatives.

Charismatic. This is focused on pursuing an intuition. It is designed to give effect to intuition, and is controlled through the judgemental character of intuition and the potential withdrawal of adherents.

Bureaucratic. This focused on running a machine. It is designed to maximize efficiency, and is controlled through the specific standards set by the top administration.

Democratic. This is focused on leading groups. It is designed to maximize happiness. It is controlled by the individual sense of responsibility and answerability to constituents.

Systemic. This is focused on adapting a system. It is designed to maximize relevance. It is controlled by the conscientiousness of the expert, the corrective of goals and the threat of non-survival.

The preconciliar organization of the Catholic church

The pre-conciliar organization of the Catholic church was generally bureaucratic in its higher reaches, and in particular countries (eg the United States and Germany). In its lower reaches it was generally traditional. Charismatic organization was generally confined to the formative period of religious orders, and to the parallel movements. Democratic organization was almost non-existent. Systemic organization developed briefly from time to time under the influence of a leader who recognized the need to adapt the church to its changing environment, but with the passing of each such leader the organization reverted to the traditional or bureaucratic types. Pope John XXIII typifies the systemic leader.

Bureaucratic organization depends for its legitimation upon the office charisms of the top leader. That is why bureaucracies, if permitted, go to such lengths to eliminate critics and opponents of the top leader. The top leader in a bureaucracy has therefore a strong affective orientation in the role: he must symbolize the unity and identity of the organization and be preoccupied with the maintenance of loyalty. The top leadership in a traditional society or organization has also to be preoccupied with the maintenance of group identity and group loyalty. This too involves a strong affective orientation.

The bureaucratic leader is also the pinnacle of the hierarchical decision-making process: information about problems flows up to him, and decisions to be executed flow down. The leadership has decisions to make but most of them are routine. The process is characterized by high alienation, but compliance is maintained by the giving of

instrumental rewards, such as high salaries and benefits in kind, and by the ejection of dissidents. The alienation would be much greater but for the low proportion of critical decisions once the institution is fully established. Bureaucracy is resistant to change and slow to change. Change comes about mainly by the decline and fall of one bureaucracy and its capture or replacement by another.

Traditional organization involves relatively little decision-making, because all decisions are in effect determined by the tradition. In so far as the leader has decisions to make, they are all routine decisions and involve no dissent. Traditional organization changes extremely slowly and is quite unable to adapt to rapid social change.

When bureaucratic organization attempts rapid adaptation to change

What happens when a massive institution, organized along bureaucratic lines in some places and traditional lines in others, begins to adapt to rapid social change? Let us take the bureaucratic case first. Critical decisions are taken on a larger scale. The scale has to be large if a cultural lag of five centuries is to be closed. Because the decisions taken in principle are so far-reaching, and because the lower reaches of the bureaucracy and the mass membership are composed of groups that are unequally ready for change, these decisions are not universally welcome. As soon as decisions in principle are translated into bureaucratic orders the latent opposition becomes manifest: some groups want quicker and more general implementation; other groups want slower and more limited implementation. Whatever is done or not done to implement the decisions in principle, conflict is generated. It is inescapable; it is part of the very process of adaptation to change. If extreme cultural and social change were slow, if there were not a cultural lag measured in centuries, it would be possible to wait for a consensus to emerge before implementing critical decisions taken in principle. But with rapid social change and a lag of centuries it is impossible to await consensus. The result is continuous conflict, increasingly structured around two parties: those for quicker and wider change, and those against it. The relative strength of these two parties largely determines the speed of implementation of critical decisions.

If the bishop's role was almost purely affective it would be greatly strengthened by this continuous conflict. Aware of the division created by party conflict, the community would be all the more appreciative of the functional importance of the bishop's affective unifying role. The trouble is that few bishops have taken necessary steps to ensure that their role is almost purely affective. They generally continue to make decisions as bureaucratic leaders in their own dioceses. Their decisions are more often critical decisions. Because they both *make* and *take* these decisions, the bishops are increasingly seen as party leaders, opposed and criticized by one party or the other. This instrumental party leadership function undermines their affective unifying function to such an extent that it is now truer to speak of these as alternative episcopal roles. (If the bishop happens to have a high degree of *personal* charism he *can* combine these instrumental functions with the affective ones. But as by definition we are dealing with bureaucratic leadership, and not charismatic leadership, this does not weaken the argument). The more the bishop is seen as the maker of decisions the more he is seen as a party leader in the church, championed enthusiastically by "his" party and strongly criticized by the opposition. He is certainly an affective leader for his party, but for the opposition he is not. The longer he continues to lead his party, and the more the mass membership becomes aware of the struggle, the more his affective unifying role is damaged.

When traditional organization attempts to adapt itself

Let us now take the case of the bishop where the organization of the church is traditional. In the place of a few decisions, all of them routine and all of them accepted as a proper expression of the tradition, the traditional bishop since Vatican II has been concerned with making a host of decisions, many of them critical, that break with tradition. Again he soon finds himself in the role of party leader, strongly opposed by those who want to preserve the tradition unchanged. He escapes this dilemma only if he generally ignores the orders he gets from the church, which are bureaucratic, and even then only if the works of the Council have made no autonomous impact on his priests, religious and people.

The effect of change on the papal role

I have argued this thesis in relation to the episcopal role, but it applies with much greater force to the papal role. The pope is *par excellence* the visible symbol of unity, not merely within his own diocese, not merely in the Italian church, not merely in the church of the Latin Rite, but throughout the whole church universal. If any bishop in the church has an affective role it is the pope. Unfortunately the developments that have weakened the affective functions of the bureaucratic episcopal role have applied *a fortiori* those of the papal role. Because the formal structure of the church remains that of a highly centralized bureaucracy, executive decisions to implement the decisions in principle of the Council tend to be made, delayed, or not made, in Rome. Thus conflict over these decisions is concentrated on Rome. Because the pope has chosen or accepted the role of party leader of the conservatives in the Roman curia he has ensured that the criticism and opposition directed at "Rome" is effectively directed at himself. This has in four years done appalling damage to the affective, unifying role of the papacy.

The damage has been accentuated by curial reversal of the principle of ministerial responsibility. The charism of a modern head of state is generally preserved by a constitutional principle that a minister (or the cabinet collectively) is responsible – and not the head of state – for any executive action that provokes a political crisis. This is a strict rule in democracies having a constitutional monarch or non-executive president, but it is also encountered in democracies having an executive president, and even in some authoritarian regimes. The Roman curia however *reverses* the principle: curial heads attribute to the pope decisions taken by themselves or by junior departmental officials. Instead of systematically *preserving* the office charisms of the papacy, curial officials are at all levels trying to *borrow* it to legitimize their own decisions. This is intensely damaging to the papal charisms, but it must be noted that the same process is at work in the diocesan bureaucracies in many countries. Officials of diocesan school commissions, for instance, parry criticism of *their* decisions by arguing that they are the *bishop's* personal decisions.

THE WAY TO A SOLUTION

A separation of functions

How is the church to restore to the papal and Episcopal roles the affective unifying functions so gravely weakened since the end of the Council? I suggest that a solution can be found if the instrumental functions of the pre-conciliar papal and episcopal roles are transferred to subordinate officials who accept full responsibility for the formal advice they give to pop and bishop, and who are permitted by pope and bishop to exercise these instrumental functions only so long as they have the confidence of a majority of representatives of the People of God. Let us examine separately each of these points and its implications, first for the pope and then for the diocesan bishop.

The pope, the conservatives and the central government of the church

The first suggestion is that the pope should abandon his present role of party leader of the conservative party and entrust instrumental partisan leadership functions to the secretary of state whose formal advice in non-doctrinal matters he would normally accept. This involves the secretary of state and his cabinet of heads of departments of the Roman curia accepting full ministerial responsibility for the conduct of their departments and for the formal advice they give to the pope. They would not be free to "borrow" the papal charisms to protect themselves from unpopular decisions: they would be publicly recognized as *responsible* leaders of the papal administration. The pope would not thereby abandon his authority to govern the church: he would retain the ultimate power to dismiss his ministers, and would be expected to use this power if the secretary of state and the cabinet failed to resign after receiving a clear expression of no confidence from the ordinary synod. As the pope would have the authority to dismiss his ministers, he would expose himself to public odium if he were to retain in high office partisan instrumental leaders who had by their conduct of the government of the church lost the general confidence of the People of God. (It must be recognized that at the present time the leadership in the curia does not collectively have the general confidence of the church.)

Doctrinal decisions

When doctrinal decisions are concerned, the affective functions of the papacy would be likewise protected by ensuring that the decisions to make or not to make a development of doctrine is made by the apostolic-episcopal college as a whole or by some authentic representative of it, such as the ordinary synod. Then in so far as the decision does not express the *consensus fidelium* the responsibility for it will be widely diffused and not concentrated in the pope. In this way the damage done to his affective functions by decisions like that on birth control will be avoided.

The monitoring functions of the pope

The loss of the instrumental functions of the pope would not reduce him to a mere figurehead. It would free him to exercise the monitoring functions of the leader, which are a basic feature of the systemic type of organization. This type of organization is focused on adaptation. In the ten years since 1959 the church has moved far in the effort to adapt itself to external change, mainly under the inspiration either of systemic leaders, who have recognized how urgent it was to assess the implications of environmental change, to re-express Christian beliefs and value in a way that would restore their credibility and to re-state the goals of the church in meaningful terms, or of charismatic leaders who felt intuitively the need for development and change. This "monitoring" function of the leader, neglected for centuries, was re-discovered in 1959. It does not involve the leader in making multitudes of routine decisions but rather in clarifying the purpose of the organization. Such a function is quite compatible with the affective unifying functions. Indeed it is to the affective leader that the community naturally turns for the clarification of its purpose.

The diocesan bishop and his administration

How does this prescription apply to the bishop? He can of course be an instrumental partisan leader, by serving as a responsible minister in the central, continental or national government of the church. As an auxiliary bishop he can be the partisan instrumental leader in a diocese. But as diocesan bishop he should relinquish his instrumental functions to a responsible vicar general, and concentrate on his affective role. He would normally accept the formal advice of his vicar general, who would be seen as responsible for the decisions formally taken by the diocesan bishop. So long as the vicar general and his administration retained the confidence of the diocesan pastoral council, they would exercise the instrumental leadership functions. But if they failed to resign after receiving a clear expression of no confidence, the bishop would be expected to dismiss them.

Two additional developments

I have stressed that the object of this separation of functions is to protect the affective functions of pope and bishop. I have argued that such a development is quite compatible with a move away from traditional and bureaucratic types of organization towards the systemic, which alone is capable of rapid adaptation to change. Two developments I have already alluded to will support both these ends.

The first is relinquishment by pope and bishop of routine decision-making. The systemic type of organization relies not on the obedience of subordinates to the orders of their superiors, but on the commitment of highly competent men to the organization and to its goals *as defined by the leadership*. The concentration of routine decision-making in the leadership role is the main reason why bureaucratic institutions find it so difficult to adapt themselves to a changing environment. It also exposes the leadership quite unnecessarily to unpopularity resulting from contentious decisions. Pope and bishop should therefore concentrate their decision-making activity on those decisions that are critical in their consequences, and leave routine decision-making to partisan instrumental leaders.

The second is to ensure that the decisions taken by the pope and bishop are *made* collegially. There are two reasons for this. A group is more effective in exploring the wide range of considerations that have a bearing on critical decisions than are either men alone or men engaged in separate dialogues with individual subordinates. The criteria of relevant considerations are usually wider in a collegial body, and there is less inhibition about discussing these considerations. The leader therefore is much better briefed after a collegial discussion than after a series of separate dialogues. The better the discussion, the narrower the ultimate range of options open to the leader. Ideally, the

discussion is so thorough, and the facts and principles so clear in their implications, that the decision finally *taken* by the leader is effectively *made* by the college: the leader simply promulgates it and legitimates it with his charisms. Given the extent of cultural lag in the church and the greater variations in rates of attitude change in the church, such consensus is likely to be rare for some time to come. But given a willingness on the part of pope and bishop to make critical decisions collegially, to concentrate their attention on such decisions, and to examine all considerations that are alleged to have a bearing on critical problems, there seems no reason to believe that they will not within a reasonable time find themselves in agreement at least with a clear majority of their respective colleges. This happened during the Council. If pope and bishop steps to ensure that they possess, and summon regularly, collegial bodies that are recognized as properly representative of the church, the success of the Council in critical decision-making can be repeated throughout the church.

When decisions are *made* collegially they are psychologically defused. Those who dislike the decision will not direct any hostility they may feel at the leader who finally *takes* the decision, because they know it was *made* by the college as a whole. The expressive, unifying functions of the leader will therefore be unimpaired.

CONCLUSION

In summary, the central dilemma in the papal and Episcopal roles since the Council lies in the conflicting demands of the affective and instrumental functions, which could be combined without difficulty only so long as the church was not attempting to adapt itself to rapid social change. Now that the church is trying to adapt itself, internal conflict is a necessary feature of the adaptive process. Loose parties have emerged, social forces for and against change. This too is inevitable. By continuing to exercise their former instrumental leadership functions the pope and many bishops have become party leaders, thus weakening their capacity to exercise their unifying affective functions.

The solution lies in pope and bishops discarding their instrumental leadership functions and concentrating on their affective unifying functions. Their discarded instrumental functions would be taken over respectively by a responsible secretary of state and a responsible vicar general whose formal advice the pope and bishop would normally accept, and who would be permitted to exercise the power that formally belonged to pope and bishop only so long as they retain the confidence of representative colleges such as an ordinary synod and a diocesan pastoral council. Pope and bishop should look to the constitutional monarch and the non-executive president for models of their future roles.

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